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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: WILL IT SUCCEED OR
FAIL? DETERMINATIVE FACTORS AND CASE STUDY ON

THIS QUESTION
Thomas Thompson-Flores*
I.

Introduction

On July 1, 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) celebrated its seventh
birthday. In its first eight years of existence the ICC has had to overcome many
obstacles, some of which have stemmed from the very creation of the Court itself. Consequently, the ICC's new and unique rules and procedures have required its judges to fill in any gaps throughout each step of the process.' Other
obstacles have been created by state actors, such as the United States, that view
the ICC as a threat to their sovereignty and ability to engage in international
matters with carte blanche authority. 2 Several states have criticized the ICC for
appearing to focus its prosecutions solely on the African continent.3
The first ICC trial, concerning the matter of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo only began on January 26, 2009, after numerous delays, most of which arose due to the
Prosecution's lack of disclosure of confidential information to the Defense.4
Though the issue was finally resolved, the case illustrates the difficulty involved
in prosecuting a foreign national for violating newly recognized international
norms under the new, untested, International Criminal Court. In terms of the
future success of the ICC, however, procedure is a rather minor issue. The aim
* J.D., University of Miami, L.L.M., Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights, expected September 2011. I am very grateful to the The Loyola University Chicago
International Law Review, specifically Furqan Mohammed, for his work in reviewing and revising this
article. I would also like to thank Jason Morgan-Foster for his remarks and guidance.
I See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 1, Judgment
on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims'
Participation of 18 January 2008 (July 11, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/
C1033BFB-9FF9-4B9F-A54D-04D8F57BOF46.htm (outlining the scope of victims participation before
ICC proceedings); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status
Conference on 10 June 2008 (June 13, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/E9A435529F36-4BOD-945F-67Al5ACIF74A.htm (issuing a stay in the Lubanga proceedings because the Prosecution had not disclosed to the Defense exculpatory evidence that it collected subject to Article 54(3)(e)).
2 NATIONAL SECURrTY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 31 (2002), availableat http://
merin. ndu.edulwhitepapers/USnss2002.pdf (rejecting the jurisdiction of the ICC).
3 Kofi Annan, Op-Ed., Africa and the InternationalCourt, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/06/30/opinion/30iht-edannan.html.
4 The conflict arose over the failure by the Prosecutor to disclose to the Defense all its evidence and
the identities of witnesses testifying against Lubanga. Under the rules and regulations that govern the
court, the prosecutor is supposed to pass over exculpatory evidence, which he finds in the course of his
investigations, to defense lawyers and judges. Finally, on November 18, 2008, ICC judges lifted the
formal "stay of proceedings" and set the Lubanga trial for January 26, 2009. Wairagala Wakabi, Timeline: Lubanga's War Crimes Trial at the ICC, Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/09/14/

timeline-lubanga's-war-cimes-trial-at-the-icc/.
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of this paper is to discuss two main challenges facing the ICC, the outcomes of
which will help determine the future success or failure of the ICC. The first
obstacle is the lack of involvement from major states, especially the United
States. The second involves complementarity-the conflicts between national
jurisdictions and the ICC's jurisdiction. Within this legal conflict, there are certain social considerations as well, such as the balance between peace and justice.
To illustrate their effect and importance, and the considerable disagreement that
these issues have caused, this article will present a case study of the situation in
Darfur, Sudan, specifically focusing on the ICC arrest warrant of Omar AlBashir, the current President of Sudan. In order to properly contextualize this
discussion, however, it is essential to begin with some background on international criminal law and the creation of the ICC. Accordingly, Part II discusses
the history of international criminal law. Part III outlines the history of the ICC.
Part IV briefly details the basic structure and rules of the ICC. Part V discusses
the lack of U.S. support for the ICC ranging from the administrations of Presidents Clinton to Obama. Part VI deals with the issue of complementarity between the ICC and national governments. Part VII is a case study of the situation
in Darfur, Sudan. Finally, Part VIII concludes with this author's opinion on the
future of the ICC.
II.

History of International Criminal Law

The last 100 years of globalization have seen the proliferation and acceptance of
international criminal law throughout the majority of nation states. The idea,
however, had already been proposed in various forms by legal scholars centuries
earlier. The first international criminal trial, in 1474, was that of Peter von
Hagenbach who was convicted of rape, murder and perjury by an ad hoc international criminal tribunal made up of twenty-eight judges from throughout Europe. 5
The tribunal claimed his crimes were crimes that "trampled under foot the laws
of God and man." 6 From that point until the 19th Century, there was no progress
in the field of international criminal law. 7
By the 19th Century, the International Red Cross was one of several groups
advocating for the creation and enforcement of international criminal law. In
1872, Switzerland's Gustave Moynier, a founder of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), proposed a system whereby each party to a conflict
would, after the cessation of hostilities, choose a judge to join three other neutral
judges sitting on a panel. 8 This ad hoc panel would pass sentences, which would
be implemented by the states themselves. 9 The idea, however, was largely op5 The prosecution of Peter von Hagenback still presented issues. The trial was considered by some
as victor's justice: Did the judges really form an international panel? Who was the rightful prince of
Breisach, the town where Peter von Hagenback committed his actions? See MARLIES GLASlus, THE

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL

CIVIL

SOCIETY ACHIEVEMENT 5 (Routledge 2006).

6 Id.

7 See id. at 5-6 (Marlies Glasius' book, as well as others, fail to mention any developments in the
field of international criminal law until the 19th Century).
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id.
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posed by both states and international lawyers and the notion of any international
criminal prosecution was left at the wayside for many years.10
At the turn of the century, with the adoption of 'The Hague Conventions' in
1899 and 1907, a new movement began, aimed at the codification of the laws of
war."1 Unfortunately, although diplomats at these conferences were successful in
codifying these legal norms, they were not able to establish a judicial institution
with the power to enforce them. A convention establishing an international criminal court was proposed at the second Hague Conference of 1907 and signed by
39 states but was never ratified due to a failure to codify specific laws that the
court could enforce. 12 Even after the horrors of World War I, an international
criminal court never materialized. 13 While the Treaty of Versailles treaty provided for ad hoc tribunals, it afforded jurisdiction only over military officials. 14
Even then, Germany refused to hand anyone over for prosecution and the Allies
were reluctant to press the matter.1 5 During the 1920's and 30's many Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) promoted the creation of an international criminal court but with little success. 1 6 Benjamin Ferencz, who later became one of
the prosecutors in the Nuremberg Tribunal stated, "despite the almost universal
support of scholars all over the world.. .the powerful nations of the world were
simply not ready for a Court with compulsory jurisdiction." 17 This fear is still
present today among several of the most powerful nations.' 8
After the Second World War there were two prominent ad hoc tribunals created for the prosecution of war criminals: the Nuremburg Tribunall 9 and Tokyo
War Tribunal. 2 0 Not surprisingly however, these tribunals have, over the years,
received mixed reactions. Some have hailed the trials as an example of justice at
work, 2 1 while others have dubbed them mere show trials, imposed by the victors
to Id.
II Id. at 7.

12This would be an appellate court that would review the decisions of national courts on the seizure
of ships and cargo during times of war. MICHAEL J. STRUETr, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGOs, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 51 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
13 YusuF AKSAR,

14

FROM
44-45 (Routledge 2004).

IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:

TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

AD-HOC TRIBUNALS

GLASIUS, supra note 5, at 7.

15 ID.
16
17
18

Id.
Id. at 7-8.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, All Justice, Too, Is Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, http://query.

nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E5D81739F933AO5751CIA9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&page
wanted=all.
19 The Nuremburg Tribunal was created after the end of Second World War by the Allies to prose-

cute Nazi leaders for committing crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See
generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 11-12
(William Driscoll, et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter GLOBAL POLMCS]
20 Id. at 13. A similar tribunal, known as the Tokyo War Tribunal, was established after the Second
World War to prosecute Japanese war criminals.
21 David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1281, 1284

(2009).
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of war against the defeated states (i.e. victor's justice). 2 2 As the philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre stated, "The Nuremberg Tribunal, an ambiguous body, was no
doubt born of the right of the strongest, but at the same time it opened a perspective for the future by setting a precedent, the embryo of a tradition." 23
The creation of the United Nations Organization (UN) was a major step toward the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. In Resolution 260, passed on December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 24 The
Convention characterizes genocide as a crime under international law. 2 5 More
importantly, in the same resolution, the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission (ILC) "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ to prosecute individuals charged with
genocide." 2 6 Even with the passage of the convention, nothing materialized for
forty years, mainly because powerful states feared the creation of an international
judicial organ would usurp their role in the international arena. 2 7 The ILC ultimately advocated the creation of an international criminal court, prepared a draft
statute in 1951,28 and a revised draft statute in 1953,29 but it was never passed by
the UN General Assembly. 30 It was not until the 1990's that events occurred
which helped sway public opinion in favor of the creation of a permanent inter31
national criminal court to try major war criminals.
III. History of the International Criminal Court
During the 1990's, a confluence of factors helped create enough momentum to
overcome the obstacles that had impeded the creation of an international criminal
court in the past. During this period, war broke out in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 3 2
Both wars were extremely brutal, prompting accusations of several instances of
rape, torture and genocide.3 3 In response, the UN Security Council in 1993
22 Id.

23 GLASIUS, supra note 5, at 8 (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, a 20th-century French philosopher, novelist

and political activist).
24 GLOBAL PoLIrns, supra note 19, at 24.
25 Id.
26 Id.

27 See Patricia A. McKeon, An InternationalCriminal Court: Balancing the Principleof Sovereignty
Against the Demands for InternationalJustice, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 535, 538 (1997).
28 International Law Commission, Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,http://untreaty.

un.org/ilc/summaries/7_2.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
29 Id.

30 Id. The General Assembly postponed consideration of the draft statute pending the adoption of a
definition of aggression.
31 Cassandra Jeu, A Successful, Permanent InternationalCriminal Court. . . "Isn'tit Pretty to Think

So?", 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 411, 421-24 (2004). There are several events; however, the most important
ones are the end of the Cold War, and the wars that erupted in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
32 See Amy Palmer, An Evolutionary Analysis of Gender-Based War Crimes and the Continued Tolerance of Forced Marriage, 7 Nw. U. J. INT'L Hum. RTS. 128, at *17-20 (2009).
33 Id.
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adopted a UN Resolution 827, which established an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute
the perpetrators of atrocities committed in Yugoslavia.34 This tribunal became
known as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).3 5 In the
winter of the following year, in response to the genocide that had occurred in
Rwanda, 3 6 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955, which established
another ad hoc tribunal with similar powers, which became known as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).37 These ad hoc tribunals were
temporary entities that were created to deal with issues arising from specific conflicts.3 8 The results of these tribunals have been mixed.39 They would, however,
prove useful as examples for the soon to be created ICC.
A second important factor which helped spur states into finally coming together to form an international criminal court, was the influence of NGOs. A
group of NGOs first came together in 1995 to form a coalition, called the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), in an effort to coordinate their
efforts to ensure the establishment of the ICC. 4 0 The CICC was able to use the
resources and expertise (media, legal, etc.) of its members in order to engage in
direct lobbying, produce position papers, and publish media editorials in the hope
of informing states and the public at large about the need for an international
criminal court.41 The conference that resulted from these lobbying efforts, called
the Rome Conference, was attended by 160 states, 33 intergovernmental organizations, and a coalition of 236 NGOs. 4 2 After the creation of the ICC, the CICC
not only continued to exist, but expanded to include over 2,500 organizations
worldwide. Today, its goal is to "ensure that the Court is fair, effective and
independent." 4 3
In the early 1990's, at the request of the UN General Assembly, the ILC resumed its work of creating a draft statute for an international criminal court.
Eventually, in 1994, it submitted a draft statute for an international criminal court
34 S.C. Res. 827, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508 (May 25, 1993), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20
Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf.
35 Id.
36 PALMER, supra note 32, at 19. During a period of three months in 1994 genocide raged in
Rwanda between the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority which killed between 500,000 and one

million Rwandan men, women and children.
37 S.C. Res. 955,
10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), http://www.un.org/ictr/englishlResolu
tions/955e.htm
38 ROBERT S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - THE MAKINGS OF THE ROME STATUTE:
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS 6 (Springer 1999).
39 GLASIUS, supra note 5, at 12-13. These courts have been hindered by lack of funds and diplomatic
wrangling over appointments. However, they have been successful in bringing high-level war criminals
to justice such as Milosevic and Karadzic.
40 COALMON FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OUR HISTORY, http://www.iccnow.org/

?mod=cicchistory (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
41 STRUETr, supra note 12, at 71-81.
42 Eric M. Meyer, InternationalLaw: The Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers'
Protection Act, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 97, 103 (2005).
43 COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ABOUT THE COALITION, http://www.

iccnow.org/?mod=coalition (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
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to the General Assembly."4 The draft was very conservative in the scope and
power that the Court could yield, especially in comparison to the ultimate structure of the ICC formed at the 1998 Rome Conference." 4 5 Before the 1998 Rome
Conference, the General Assembly created a preparatory committee to complete
the drafting of the text.4 6 Further changes were made during the Rome Conference, which took place from June 15, 1998 to July 17, 1998. On July 17, 1998,
120 countries voted in favor of the Treaty containing the Statute for the ICC.47
Twenty-one countries abstained, while the United States joined China, Libya,
Iraq, Israel, Qatar, and Yemen as the only seven countries that voted in opposition to the Treaty. 48 The Court itself came into existence on July 1, 2002, when
the 60th country ratified it.49 Presently 114 states have ratified the Rome Statute
thereby becoming state parties.50 Another 39 have signed but not ratified the
Treaty, including the United States.51
IV.

Basic Structure and Rules of the Court

Before reviewing the main obstacles standing in the way of the ICC's success, a
brief description of some of the articles of the Rome Statute is needed to provide
a context for later discussion.
Article 1 of the Rome Statute explains that the ICC is only a court of complementarity (complementary to national criminal jurisdictions) with jurisdiction
over serious international crimes. 5 2 Article 5 of the Rome Statute lays out the
crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction over. These include: (a) the crime of
genocide; (b) crimes against humanity; (c) war crimes; and, (d) the crime of
44 GLOBAL POLITICS, supra note 19, at 24-25.

45 The ICL draft did not define or develop the definitions of what constitutes a crime under international law as compared to the final draft of the Rome Statute. The ICL draft permitted states to accept the
court's jurisdiction with respect to some crimes and not others. The final draft of the Rome Statute does
not allow the states such discretion. STRUETT, supra note 12, at 71-72.
46 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/2 (April 14, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icc/prepcom.htm
47 Michael P. Scharf, ASIL Insights: Results of the Rome Conference for an InternationalCriminal

Court, (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm.
48

Id.

49 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ABOUT THE COURT,

http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+

the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
50

United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court,

available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XVIII-10&chap
ter-18&lang=en. [Hereinafter Status of the Rome Statute]
51 Id.
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, pmbl., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute], availableat http://www.icc-cpi.
int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE940A655EB30EI6/0/RomeStatute-English.pdf.
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aggression. 53 . The ICC's jurisdiction over these crimes does not apply
retroactively. 54
Unlike the ICTY or the ICTR, Article 11 states that the ICC only has jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after the implementation of the Rome Statute, July 1, 2002.55 Article 12 outlines the preconditions to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC, both with respect to states that are a party to the Rome
Statute and to those that are not.5 6 Article 13 lists the three instances when the
court may exercise jurisdiction over the crimes mentioned in Article 5: (a) when
a state party refers a case to the Prosecutor in accordance with Article 14; (b)
when the security counsel refers a case to the Prosecutor by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) when the
Prosecutor has initiated an investigation himself, in accordance with Article 15
(propio motu).5 7

Article 16 grants the UN Security Council the power to suspend ICC investigations or prosecutions for a period of twelve months.5 8 Article 17 addresses the
issue of admissibility, stating most importantly, that a case is determined to be
inadmissible if it is already being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has
jurisdiction over it, unless that state is unwilling or unable to do so.5 Article 17
lays out several determining factors as to whether a state is genuinely unwilling
or unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution. 60 Article 86 explains that
state parties must cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. 61 Article 87 deals with request for
cooperation by the ICC to both state parties and non-state parties. 6 2 Lastly, Article 98 explains that the ICC may not request the surrender of an individual if it
would require the requested state to act inconsistently with: (a) its obligations
under international law with respect to diplomatic immunity, or (b) its obligations
under international agreements with a third-party state. 63

53 Id. art. 5. The definition of what constitutes a crime of aggression has lead to disputes between
countries. Article 5 itself states that "the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once a provision is adopted.
54 Id. art. 11.
55 Id.
56 Id. art. 12.
57 Id. art. 13.
58 Id. art. 16.
59 Id. art. 17(1).
60 Id. art. 17(2), (3).
61 Id. art. 86.
62 Id.
63 Id.

art. 87.
art. 98.
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V.

Lack of U.S. Support

A.

The United States' position on international criminal law, generally

Historically, the United States has been generally supportive of the international
prosecution of war crimes. 64 In fact, after the end of WWII, the United States
was the driving force behind the war tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 65 However, because of the United States' position today as the sole world power, 66 and
with its military extended into conflicts around the world,6 7 in states that are
parties to the Rome Statute, 6 8 its exposure to the ICC's jurisdiction is much
greater than any other country. Consequently, the U.S. consistently opposed to
the idea of universal jurisdiction. 6 9 The United States' position is that the prosecution of its nationals for crimes committed outside of U.S. territory can only be
carried out with its permission. 7 0
Nevertheless, the United States' position on this issue has softened over the
years. In Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that "some
crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all
people. Therefore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish
them according to its law." 7 1 Just last year in Miami, Florida, the United States
convicted Chuckie Taylor (the son of former Liberian President Charles Taylor)
for torture that he committed while serving as the head of the former Liberian
President's Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU). 72 Taylor's indictment marked the first
time that anyone had been charged under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) of 1994,"7 which grants U.S. federal courts universal jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals found within the U.S. who are suspected of torture committed anywhere in the world. 7 4 While these examples may highlight the subtle
change in U.S. policy toward recognizing universal jurisdiction, the U.S. has
been reluctant to completely shed its fears and concerns of having its citizens
75
prosecuted abroad under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
64 William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the InternationalCriminalCourt: It's all About the
Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 701, 702 (2004).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 720.
67 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DuTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY RE-

GIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY, (Dec. 31, 2007), http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MLITARY/

history/hst07l2.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
68 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE, http://www.icc-

cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
69 Meyer, supra note 42, at 98.
70 Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy
Towards the InternationalCriminal Court, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 557, 585 (2003).

71 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
72 World Organization of Human Rights, Victims of Chuckie Taylor, http://www.humanrightsusa.org/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=167&Itemid=150 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
73 Amnesty Int'l, Liberia/USA: Indictment of Chuckie Taylor for Torture, http://www.amnesty.org.

au/news/comments/646/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
74 Id.

75 See Schabas, supra note 64, at 706-07.
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B.

The Clinton Era (1993-2001)

Even though the U.S. historically was supportive of international criminal prosecutions of war criminals, it was one of seven nations to vote against the creation
of the ICC at the Rome Conference in 1998.76 In truth, the U.S. was originally
supportive of the ILC's final draft of the ICC statute submitted to the UN General
Assembly in 1994, which included a section that recommended that the ICC be
subordinate to the UN Security Council.7 7 That provision would have given the
Security Council a final say over any ICC prosecution, barring the ICC Prosecutor from initiating a case without the Security Council's approval. 7 8 Bill Richardson, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, echoed the United
State's desire that the Security Council must play an important role in the work
of the ICC. 7 9
The provision was not included in the final version of the Rome Statute, however, and in response, the U.S. delegation, lead by Ambassador David Scheffer,
expressed several concerns including: the risk that U.S. peacekeepers might be
subject to ICC prosecution; the power of the ICC Prosecutor to initiate investigations unilaterally; the inclusion of the crime of aggression; and, the inability of
signatory parties to ratify with reservations. 80
However, several of the concerns expressed by the United States were merely
half-hearted arguments in justification of its vote against the adoption of the
Rome Statute. While the Statute does impose some control over the ICC Prosecutor's discretion to prosecute individuals, these are only judicial constraints, not
political.8 1 Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council may not
halt ICC prosecutions, but may defer them for a period of twelve months, renewable upon request. 82
In addition, one must remember that the ICC is a court of complementarity.
As such, it would be unable to prosecute U.S. nationals for crimes committed in a
foreign state, as that state would have jurisdiction over the matter - unless they
are unwilling or unable to prosecute the U.S. nationals.83 The U.S. could also
halt an ICC investigation by opening up one of its own, though the United States'
record on prosecuting American servicemen for crimes committed abroad has
76 Meyer, supra note 42, at 98.
77 See Schabas, supra note 64, at 712-13.
78 Id. at 713.

79 Id.at 713-14.
80 Is a U.N. InternationalCriminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing before the Subcommittee on InternationalOperationsof the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105 Cong. 10-5 (1998) (State-

ment of David J. Scheffer, US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues) available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_senate hearings&docid=f:50976.pdf (These
are just some of the examples cited by Ambassador Scheffer during his statement.).
81 Sharf, supra note 47. Article 15 of the Rome Statute guards against the ICC prosecutor's power
by requiring the approval of a three-judge pre-trial chamber before the prosecution can launch an investigation. In addition, the decision of the chamber is subject to interlocutory appeal to the Appeals
Chamber.
82 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 16.
83 Id. art. 17(1).
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been underwhelming. From the My Lai Massacre in 1972 in Vietnam to the
2004 Abu Ghraib torture and prison abuse in Iraq, the U.S. government regularly
failed to properly prosecute those responsible and instead focused on the soldiers
on the ground, 84 and even when a soldier is convicted the U.S. government
reduces the sentence.85
Although Ambassador Scheffer outlined the United States' concerns about the
Rome Statute, he remarked that the experience with the tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda has "convinced us of the merit of creating a permanent
court that could be more quickly available for investigations and prosecutions
and more cost efficient in its operation." 86 On December 31, 2000, in his last day
in office, President Clinton signed the Rome Statute; that day also marked the
deadline for states to be able to sign the Statute without having ratified it.87 After
January 1, 2001, any state could only sign the Statute if it had already been
formally ratified.8 8
In signing the Rome Statute, President Clinton expressed his support for the
creation of an international criminal court and maintained the United States' long
history of commitment to the principal of accountability and tradition of moral
leadership. 89 President Clinton made clear, however, that even though he was
signing the Rome Statute he still had concerns and reservations about certain
aspects of it.90 Therefore, he maintained that he would not submit the statute to
the U.S. Senate for ratification, and urged his successor to take the same
position. 91
C.

The Bush Era (2001-2009)

While the "Clinton policy towards the International Criminal Court can be described as an attitude of cautious engagement, meaning that the U.S. would stay
committed to the Court in principle, but work aggressively to protect American
national interests during the negotiating process, the U.S. policy under the Bush
administration [was] to 'isolate and ignore' the ICC as well as to punish countries
ratifying the Court's Statute." 9 2 After the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
wanted the ability to use its military force to act unilaterally, when necessary
around the world and without any reservations or fears of prosecution for its
84 Major Deon M. Green, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacreand the Court-Martialof
Lieutenant Calley, 184 MIL. L. REV. 202, 210 (2005).
85 Laura Szumanski Steel, Michael R. Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre
and the Court-Martialof Lieutenant Calley, 46 Am. J. LEGAL HiST. 344, 344 (2004).

86 Meyer, supra note 42, at 102 (quoting Ambassador David J. Scheffer at a hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations).
87 GLOBAL POLMCS, supra note 19, at 20.
88 Id.

89 President's Statement on Signing the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 4 (Dec. 30, 2001), available at http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bint

PDFgate.cgi?WAISdoclD=1pujcR/0/2/0&WAISaction=retrieve.
90 Id.
91 Id.

92 Sadat, supra note 70, at 590.
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soldiers engaged in foreign conflicts.9 3 Therefore, in keeping with the stated
policies of the Bush administration, the U.S. attempted to "unsign" the Rome
Statute. 94
In May 2002, John R. Bolton, then the Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan stating that "the United States does not intend to become a party to the
[Rome Statute]. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising
from its signature on December 31, 2000."9 Later that year, the Bush administration went one-step further when it signed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA). 96 This legislation is also known by its nickname, the "The
Hague Invasion Act" because it authorizes the use of military force to rescue any
members of the armed forces of the United States detained by or on behalf of the
ICC.97 The Bush administration adopted many of the same concerns as the Clinton administration, but they cast them in an extreme ideological manner, arguing
that the existence of the ICC itself undermined the United States' sovereignty.9 8
As part of the ASPA, the United States government began applying pressure
on other states to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs). 99 The Bush administration argued that these BIAs had the effect of being Article 98(2) waivers. 100
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute specifies that the Court may not order a state to
surrender an individual of a third state if, in so doing, the sending state would be
violating its obligations under international agreements with the third state.101
The U.S. threatened to withdraw military aid to states that were parties to the ICC
unless they signed a BIA, which would prohibit these countries from handing
over U.S. citizens to the ICC. 10 2 Senator Jesse Helms, in a hearing discussing the
effect of the creation of the ICC on America's national interests, explained succinctly the majority opinion of the U.S. government at the time by stating that, "if
other nations are going to insist on placing Americans under the ICC's jurisdiction against their will, then Congress has a right and responsibility to place a cost
on their obstinacy, and to ensure our men and women in uniform are pro93 Id. at 591 (stating that in a September 2002, National Security Strategy document, the ICC was
viewed a constraint on the use of US military force).

94 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, International Criminal
Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, (May 6, 2002), available at http:// www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. The term "unsigning" refers to the procedure by which President Bush attempted to reverse or undo the effects of a prior treaty signature, in this case the signing of the Rome
Statute by President Clinton.
95 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan from Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R.
Bolton (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
96 Id. at 99 (Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act on August 2, 2002).
97 Sadat, supra note 70, at 557-58.
98 See id. at 593.

99 Meyer, supra note 42, at 132-33.
100 Id. at I10.
101 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 98(2).
102 Lilian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.

537, 554-55 (2003).
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tected." 0 3 By the end of 2004, the U.S. had signed BIAs with over 90 states,
both state parties and non-state parties.104
These BIAs have proven to be the most contentious part of the ASPA. The
Bush administration's position was that BIAs fall neatly under the definition of
other international treaty obligations specified in Article 98(2).Ios Opponents of
the Bush administration have argued that the use of BIAs undermine the ICC.10 6
Others have cited the use of BIA's as evidence of the United States' trend toward
unilateralism and non-cooperation.1 07 In addition, critics argued that BIAs were
not the types of international agreements contemplated by the drafters of the
Rome Statute. 0 8 The drafters realized that by the time of the Rome Conference
in the summer of 1998, many states had already signed international agreements
with each other that governed the duties that each state owed to the other's nationals, such as extradition treaties or Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs).109
While SOFAs are limited to armed military personnel, the scopes of BIAs are
much broader.11 0 This difference has been cited as a reason why BIAs do not fall
under the intended "international agreements" provided for in Article 98(2).'
In addition, the fact that BIAs do not provide any guarantee that the U.S. would
prosecute their own nationals once handed over to U.S. authorities suggests that
the sole purpose of BIAs are to grant impunity to Americans abroad."12
Opponents of the ASPA and its accompanying BIAs often point to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) for support.1 3 Article 18, of the
VCLT provides that "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty when:; (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed."1 4 The U.S. signed the VCLT in 1970, but because the U.S. Senate has
not yet given its advice and consent, the U.S. is not yet a party." 5 The U.S. State
103 Meyer, supra note 42, at 112.
104 Id. at 99.
105 Id. at 110.
106 Id. at 99.

107 Faulhaber, supra note 102, at 554.
108 Meyer, supra note 42, at 111.

109 Id. at 110 (A SOFA is "a treaty governing the legal status of members of armed forces of one state
(the sending state) stationed in another state (the receiving state) pursuant to that agreement.").
110 Id. at 111.
111 Id.

112 Id. at 127.
113 Id. at 117.
114 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18 (May 23, 1969), available at http://untreaty.

un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1Ll1969.pdf.

[Hereinafter Vienna Convention].

115 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, http://

treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXIIImtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
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Department has stated, however, that "[t]he United States considers many of the
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties." 1 6 Article 18, as noted earlier, does
not require that the interim obligation only be observed "until [the signatory]
shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty." The
problem is that there is no guidance on how this intention should be manifested." 7 The obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty imposed
by Article 18, resulted in the U.S. submitting its letter of May 2002, in which it
stated that it was withdrawing from its obligations under the Rome Statute.118
However, the pressure placed on states by the U.S. to sign BIAs effectively
forces these state, if they decide to sign a BIA with the US, to violate their
international obligations under the Rome Statute. 1 19
The Bush administration's hostility toward the ICC did soften in Bush's second term of office. One clear example of this subtle shift was in 2005 when the
situation in Darfur came before the UN Security Council. 120 As a permanent
member of the Security Council, the U.S. was in a position to veto the resolution
that would refer alleged atrocities in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor. 12 1 But, the
U.S. abstained in the vote, thereby allowing the resolution to pass.1 22 Despite
U.S. concerns about the power of the Court to exert its jurisdiction over non-state
parties - in this case Sudan - it allowed the exertion of jurisdiction even though
such approval ran counter to their previous opposition of the Court. 12 3
The Obama Era (2009 - Present)

D.

The election of Barack Obama has created great excitement among legal scholars, politicians, and human rights activists, both within the United States and
abroad.12 4 Many NGOs have called on the Obama administration to engage in a
116 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES, http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).

117 Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2061, 2082 (2003).

118 US officials cited a desire for "flexibility" to pursue alternative judicial mechanisms that may be
different to the object and purpose the Rome Statute. Citizens for Global Solutions, Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Has No Legal Obligation to the International Criminal Court (May 6, 2002), http://archivel.

globalsolutions.org/programslaw-justice/icc/resources/prosper-unsigning.html
2010).

(last visited Nov. 15,

119 Meyer, supra note 42, at 133.
120 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the InternationalCriminal Court,
13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (2005).
121

Id.

122 Resolution 1593 was adopted in 2005 with 11 votes in favor and 4 votes abstaining. The resolution referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor. Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press
Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005).
123 Udombana, supra note 120, at 9-10.

124 Interview with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Prize winner, available at http://www.usatoday.
comlnews/opinion/personal-reflections.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (Archbishop Tutu expressed the
hope that President Obama will ratify the Rome Statute.)
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policy of positive engagement with the ICC. 12 5 By involving itself with the ICC,
the U.S. would get a seat at the table and have the ability to shape and influence
the Court in ways that meet its concerns. 1 2 6 These NGOs have also called on the
Obama administration to repeal, or at least amend, the ASPA because the law
hinders any discussions with the ICC and states parties. 12 7 On the other hand,
some have called for the Obama administration to adopt a more cautious approach toward the ICC, claiming that the Court has yet to complete its first trial,
thereby making it premature to view the ICC as a success. 12 8
Although in his time as President, Obama has not yet ratified the Rome Statute, he has taken major steps in international human rights and criminal law
which are very different from his predecessor.1 29 In May 2010 the White House
produced The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in
which it stated that although the U.S. is not at present a party to the Rome Statute
it is "engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and
are supporting the ICC's prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests
and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law."l 3 0 In addition, as a
senator, Mr. Obama did respond in the affirmative when asked whether the
United States should ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court.131
In addition to President Obama, other members of the Obama administration
have commented on the issue of U.S. involvement with the ICC, showing so far,
a willingness to engage in discussion. 13 2 On January 29, 2009, U.S. Ambassador
to the UN Susan Rice, in her first appearance in the Security Council, spoke
about the importance of the ICC as an instrument to prosecute those responsible
for committing atrocities, winning her the praise of many of the other envoys

L.

125 Bruce Zagaris, Obama Administration Signals Engagement with the ICC, 25 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
REP. 157 (2009)

126 Roseann M. Latore, Escape out the Back Door or Charge in the FrontDoor: U.S. Reactions to the
InternationalCriminal Court, 25 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 159, 174-75 (2002).

Zagaris, supra note 125.
According to Stephen Rademaker, former assistant secretary of state in the Republican Bush administration, President Obama should move cautiously toward full support of the ICC. Bill Varner,
127
128

Obama's Envoy Voices Supportfor InternationalCourt, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.

bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=AYKULgi3Ix0&refer-us.
129 In President Obama's address on national security at the National Archives in Washington:
"Rather than keep us safer, the prison at Guantanamo has weakened American national security." Ed
Henry et al., Obama defends plan to close Gitmo, CNN, May 21, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
POLITICS/05/21/obama.speech/index.html.
130 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America is a document prepared periodically by the White House which addresses the major national security concerns facing the U.S. and how
the administration plans to deal with these concerns. THE WHTE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURrrY STRATEGY
48 (May 2010), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security
strategy.pdf.
131 Citizens for Global Issues, Elections and Candidates: Responses from Barack Obama (D-IL),

http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/politics/elections-and-candidates/questionnaire/2004?id=20 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
132 Zagaris, supra note 125.
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who were present that day.133 At her confirmation, Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton also spoke very highly of the ICC as well, stating, "we will end hostility
towards the ICC, and look for opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in
ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice." 13 4 Later,

in the fall of 2009 US envoy for war crimes Stephen Rapp announced that his
country will for the first time attend, as an observer, the annual ICC meeting in
The Hague from 18 to 26 November 2009.135 Recently, the Administration sent
a U.S. delegation to participate at the first-ever Review Conference on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Kampala, Uganda from 31
May to 11 June 2010. 136
VI.
A.

Complementarity
What is Complementarity?

The principal of complementarity in international criminal law seeks to strike a
balance between the ability to prosecute individuals for international crimes
while safeguarding the sovereignty of states. 137
One of the major points of contention at the Rome Conference in 1998 surrounded the issue of complementarity.13 8 Previous international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR were only ad hoc tribunals created by and
under the authority of the UN Security Council, with the sole task of investigating and prosecuting those responsible for mass atrocities committed during those
specific conflicts in the former Yugoslavial 39 and Rwanda.140 The ICC, by contrast, is a permanent criminal court with worldwide jurisdiction over any person,
provided that the crime in question is one mentioned in Article 5 of the Rome
Statute, and that the Court exercises its jurisdiction in one of the methods enumerated in Article 13.141 Consequently, as a result of the ICC's broad jurisdiction, the question arose as to when the ICC should defer to national courts in the
prosecutions of war criminals.142
133 The list of envoys who praised Ambassador Rice include French Ambassador Jean-Maurice
Ripert, Croatian Ambassador Neven Jurica, and Costa Rican Ambassador Jorge Urbina. Varner, supra
note 128.
134 Zagaris, supra note 125.
135 U.S. to Resume Engagement with ICC, BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8363282.stm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010).

136 State Department Press Conference with Legal Advisor Harold Koh and Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crime Issues Stephen Rapp (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us-releases/
remarks/143 178.htm [Hereinafter State Department Press Conference]
137 Jo Stigen, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL
JuIusDIcTrIoNs: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 17 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008).
138 See MOHAMED M. EL ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 131-32 (Brill 2008).
139 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34; see also LEE, supra note 38, at 6.
140 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 37; see also LEE, supra note 38, at 6.

141 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 13.
142 ZEIDY, supra note 138, at 131-32.
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To determine whether the ICC's jurisdiction should supersede that of national
courts, there are several considerations that must be taken into account. For example, national courts in the territorial state where the incident occurred would
have greater access to evidence and witnesses.14 3 These national courts would
also have a greater interest in the prosecution because the crimes occurred in
their territory."'4 However, this greater interest can lead to questions of impartiality and fairness. 14 5 The ICC is a nonpartisan court made up of judges from
around the world, with rules and procedures that ensure fairness and impartiality.14 6 Since the Second World War it has been common practice of national
courts prosecuting serious human rights violations committed anywhere in the
world. 14 7 However, the idea of a permanent international criminal court with
broad jurisdiction caused concern among at the Rome Conference in 1998.148
Therefore, the representatives in attendance at the Rome Conference came to an
agreement on a system of complementarity. 14 9 Under this system the role of the
ICC is to complement national courts and function solely as a court of last resort. 50 The ICC is intended to supplement, rather than supplant, the domestic
punishment of international violations.15 1 ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
has stated that "[a]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that
reach the Court should not be a measure of efficiency. On the contrary, the
absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success." 5 2
Several articles in the Rome Statute lay out this system of complementarity.
Article 1 of the Rome Statute maintains that the ICC only compliments national
criminal jurisdictions; it does not take their place.153 Article 17, which deals with
admissibility, states that a case is inadmissible if the case is being investigated by
a state that has jurisdiction over it (i.e. where the incident occurred, where the
defendant is from, etc.), unless the state is unwilling or unable to investigate or
143 William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 68 (2008).
144 See Louise Arbour, Will the ICC have an Impact on UniversalJurisdiction?,1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.

585, 586 (2003).
145 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 17(2)(c); see also Mba Chidi Nmaju, Violence in Kenya: Any
Role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability?, 3 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 78, 92 (2009).
146 See Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 36.
147 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, http://www.amnesty.org/en/internationaljustice/issues/universal-jurisdiction (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
148 ZEIDY, supra note 138, at 131-32.
149 See Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 17.
150 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the InternationalCriminal Court,
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 30 (2005).
151 Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 115, 116 (2010).

13

152 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement Made at the Ceremony After Election as
the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Reports+and+Statements/Press+
Releases/Press+Releases+2003/.
153 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 1.
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prosecute.15 4 A failure to prosecute may stem, for example, from political instability in the national jurisdiction or from a non-independent judiciary.' 55 As the
party asserting jurisdiction, the ICC Prosecutor bears the burden of proving that
the state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution.15 6
The Court considers several factors in determining whether a state is unwilling or
unable to prosecute. These include; (1) whether the national proceedings undertaken are or were for the purpose of shielding the accused from ICC criminal
prosecution; (2) whether there is an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings; and
(3) whether the proceedings were being conducted independently or
impartially.' 5 7
In the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the ICC was confronted with the issue of complementarity. 58 The Court determined that a case
before the ICC will only be declared inadmissible under the complementarity
principle when the "[concurrent] national proceeding encompass both the person
and the conduct which is subject of the case before the Court."1 5 9 That means
that the national proceeding must be charging the same person, pursuing the
same charges, and involving the same criminal conduct, as the ICC proceeding.
The problem is that the Court's ruling on complementarity is much narrower than
the definition found in Article 17 of the Rome Statute. The ruling interpretation
on complementarity is very stringent and favors prosecution by the ICC over

national courts.1 6 0
States that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute have tried to bring their
domestic laws into harmony with the ICC provisions by passing legislation.
However, every state has done so differently. In Australia, there can be no prosecution without the consent of the Attorney General.16 1 In Denmark, it is the
Minister of Justice that decides the matter upon a request from the ICC for the
extradition of an individual. 162 Portugal can prosecute any perpetrators of ICC
crimes, but only within the provisions of the Portuguese criminal legislature.1 6 3
Even though each of these states passed its own unique implementing legislation,
154 Id. art. 17(1)(a).

155 Id. art. 17(2), (3); see also Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an Integrated
Approach to Resoling the Crisis in Darfur: The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and Related Issues in the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1080-81 (2008).
156 Megan A. Fairlie, EstablishingAdmissibility at the International Criminal Court: Does the Buck
Stop with the Prosecutor,Full Stop?, 39 INT'L LAW. 817, 823-24 (2005).
157 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 17(2).
158 Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation
of Documents in to the Record of the Case Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 31 (Feb. 24, 2006).
159 Id.
160 See ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON, ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 155 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
161 Dragana Radosavljevic, An Overview of the ICC Complementarity Regime, J. TURKISH WEEKLY,
Sept.

12. 2007,

http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/235/an-overview-of-the-icc-complementarity-re

gime.html.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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they all share a common concern; not wanting their own sovereignty compromised by the ICC.'1' With the exception of a Security Council resolution (e.g
Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC), national
courts maintain a great deal of power under the complementarity principle.16 5
B.

Balance Between Peace and Justice

In the summer of 2008, Judge Mauro Politi of the ICC, speaking at the International Criminal Law Network Lecture on the 10th anniversary of the adoption of
the Rome Statute, stated that one of the major challenges facing the ICC is the
issue of trying to balance the sometimes dueling interests of peace and justice.166
The Rome Statute was established on the conviction that the most serious
crimes of concern to the whole international community as a whole threaten the
peace, security, and well-being of the worldl 67 and that their effective prosecution contributes to the prevention of such crimes.16 8 In other words, one of the
founding principles of the Rome Statute is that justice ensures, reinforces, and
paves the way for long lasting peace.
Accordingly, the effective prosecution of atrocities not only enables the rehabilitation, reintegration, and resocialization of victims and the affected communities, but also greatly contributes to the deterrence of similar crimes in the future
by ending impunity for perpetrators. 16 9 Thus, according to this line of reasoning,
"there can be no peace without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful
law without a Court to decide what is just and lawful under any given
circumstance." 170
Others disagree, however, and argue that ICC's investigations and prosecutions will actually harm local populations in conflict territories.' 7 1 By prosecuting militia leaders or central political figures that are actively engaged in ongoing
conflicts, the Court's actions can drive a wedge into peace negotiations.172 The
tension between peace and justice during reconciliation talks is most apparent
when militia leaders and government heads claim that they will not agree to any
peace settlement until they are granted impunity from ICC prosecution,17 3 which
164 Id.
165 Id.

166 Mauro Politi, Former Judge of the International Criminal Court, address at the ICLN Conference
in the Hague, Netherlands (June 25, 2008).
167 Rome Statute, supra note 52, pmbl. 3.
168 Id. 5.
169 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 409,

410 (2000).
170 GLOBAL POLrrIcs, supra note 19, at 27 (quoting Benjamin B. Ferencz, a former Nuremberg

prosecutor).
171 Daniel Wallis, Rwanda Genocide Court Poses Questions on Justice, REUTERS, Aug. 7, 2008, http:/

/www.reuters.com/article/idUSL768889220080807?pageNumberl 1.
Id.
173 Council on Foreign Relations, Stephanie Hanson, In Uganda, Peace Versus Justice (Nov. 17,
172

2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/12049/in-ugandapeace-versus-justice.html?breadcrumb=%2
findex.
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is something the ICC has not shown a willingness to do so far.174 Since the ICC
only has jurisdiction over crimes occurring after July 2002, it is often dealing
with crimes that are associated with ongoing conflicts, thus creating a conflict
between peace and justice.175
The fear that prosecutions may do more harm than good and destabilize the
state has caused some states, like Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, South Africa,
and even Sierra Leone, to form Truth Commissions and grant amnesties in order
to ensure peace and stability.17 6 A discussion of the relationship between peace
and justice is relevant today in light of the situation in several states where ICC
arrest warrants have been handed down. The two regions where this issue has
taken center stage are Northern Uganda and most recently Darfur, Sudan. For
over 20 years, in Northern Uganda, the Ugandan government has been fighting a
civil war in Northern Uganda against the Lord's Resistance Movement (LRA),
led by Joseph Kony.' 7 7 Recently peace talks have taken place between the LRA
and the Ugandan government, hosted by the government of Southern Sudan in
Juba.17 8 However, these peace talks have not run smoothly because Mr. Kony
has indicated that he is not prepared to sign an agreement until the ICC's arrest
warrant against him is lifted.17 9 Similarly, the ICC arrest warrant of Sudanese
President Al-Bashir has caused debate among analysts about whether the issuance of this arrest warrant will only further destabilize the situation in Darfur
causing more suffering for the people in the region.180 President Al-Bashir, Mr.
Kony, and even President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have been reluctant to
agree to any sort of amnesty after watching the former President of Liberia,
Charles Taylor, end up being tried for war crimes at the Special Court of Sierra
Leone after agreeing to an amnesty in exchange for peace. 181 Legal experts have
stated that war crimes charges supersede any amnesty. 1 8 2
The Rome Statute gives the ICC Prosecutor the discretion not to pursue investigations if, after taking into account all the circumstances, he or she determines
that it is not in the interest of justice. 8 3 However, weighing the interests of
peace against those of justice puts the Prosecutor in a difficult position. U.N.
174 Louis Charbonneau, ICC Prosecutorwon't back down on Sudan's Bashir,REUTERS, July 18, 2008,
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175 George H. Norris, Closer to Justice: Transferring Casesfrom the InternationalCriminal Court, 19
MINN. J. INT'L L. 201, 202 (2010).

176 Some Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have functioned well (e.g. South Africa), others have
had mixed results (e.g. Argentina) and yet others have been usurped by criminal prosecutions (e.g. Sierra
Leone). Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, 34 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 373, 380-85 (2006).
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http://iwpr.net/report-news/peace-versus-justice-uganda.
178 Id.
179 Id.

180 Tsegaye Tadesse, Sudan expects African support on ICC warrant,REUTERS, July 21, 2008, http://
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Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has himself spoken about the relationship between peace and justice, "We must seek to strike the correct balance between the
duty of justice and the pursuit of peace." 84 The Security Council has not yet
used Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend prosecutions, but there might be
situations in the future, where international pressure for peace may one day persuade the Security Council to suspend the prosecution of certain individuals;
however that seems unlikely at the moment, even in the case of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir.' 85 Balancing the relationship between peace and justice
has also received a lot of attention from NGOs who work in these conflict zones.
Some NGOs fear that their work on peace initiatives will be damaged by these
investigations,186 while others feel that the ICC arrest warrants have actually had
a positive effect on conflicts by putting pressure on the parties to come to a peace
agreement.' 8 7
The ICC has found itself placed in a delicate and difficult situation with the
need to balance peace and justice. Its investigations may lead to the destabilization of conflict zones because those with arrest warrants against them may become reluctant to agree to any sort of peace agreement unless they are granted
immunity from prosecution. If the ICC relents and grants immunity to those
individuals then the ICC's work will be perceived as negotiable, which will undermine its role as a deterrent against future crimes.' 8 8
VII.

Case Study: Darfur, Sudan
Background of the Situation in Darfur

A.

The situation in Darfur addresses the issues of complementarity and the relationship between peace and justice. The resolution of these issues as applied to
the situation in Darfur will bear serious implications for the Court's future effectiveness and legitimacy.189
The conflict in Sudan involves two main groups: (a) the government of Sudan
and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), a militia called the 'Janjaweed' that the
government employs to supplement its forces; and (b) the resistance forces, including the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM).o90 In response to attacks by resistance forces in
2003, the Sudanese army, with the help of the Janjaweed, launched a counter
184 Charbonneau, supra note 174.

185 Zachary Manfredi, ICC Observers Commentary: The Perils of an Article 16 Deferral, ICC OBSERVERS (Mar. 6, 2009), http://iccobservers.org/2009/03/06/icc-observers-commentary-the-perils-of-anarticle- 16-deferral/.
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187 International Crisis Group, Sudan: Justice, Peace, and the ICC (July 17, 2009), http://www.crisis

group.org/en/regions/africa/hom-of-africalsudanl152-sudan-justice-peace-and-the-icc.aspx.
188 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, GETTING THE UN INTO DARFUR (Oct. 12, 2006), http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/undarfurl 1_10_06.pdf.
189 Totten & Tyler, supra note 155, at 1071.
190 Id. at

76

1083.

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 8, Issue 1

The International Criminal Court: Will It Succeed or Fail?
insurgency campaign to wipe out the resistance forces. 9 1 In September 2004,
after the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, the UN
Security Council mandated a commission to investigate and report on the situation in Sudan. 192 The Darfur Commission found that the governmental forces
and the Janjaweed, who were financially and militarily supported by the government, had committed several crimes such as rape, looting, and massacres. 193
Their actions led to the death of thousands of civilians and to the mass displacement of the population. 194
On March 31, 2005, in response to the Darfur Commission findings, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1593 referring the Darfur case to the ICC
Prosecutor.195 The Security Council's referral was historic; it was the first time
that the Security Council referred a case to the ICC.19 6 After analyzing the evidence, the ICC Prosecutor determined that sufficient evidence existed to initiate a
full investigation. 1 9 7 On February 27, 2007, ICC Prosecutor Luis MorenoOcampo filed an application for an arrest warrant with the Court against two
Sudanese nationals; Ahmed Harun, the Minister of Interior, and Ali Kushayb, the
leader of the Janjaweed militia in West Darfur.' 9 8 On April 27, 2007, the PreTrial Chamber issued warrants for the arrest of both men.199 Neither of them
have, as of yet, been handed over to the Court.2 0 0
On July 18, 2008, the Prosecutor filed another application for an arrest warrant
involving the conflict in the Sudan. On March 3, 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber
issued the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir, which listed seven counts; five
counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes. 20 1 This marked
the first time that the ICC had issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of
state. 2 0 2 The Prosecutor had also sought three counts of genocide, but the Court
at 1086.
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and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb"), http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc%200205%200107/darfur
%20sudanlan=en-GB.
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the Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (Mar. 4, 2009)
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found that the Prosecutor had failed to prove that the government of Sudan had
acted with the intent (dolus specialis) to destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa
tribes. 203 The issuance of the arrest warrant of Harun, Kushayb, and especially
Al-Bashir, has caused significant discussion as to whether the arrest warrants
serve a higher purpose of holding even heads of states accountable for their actions, or whether, in issuing these arrest warrants, the ICC has only inflamed and
destabilized an already precarious situation. 2 04
Issues

B.

One important issue raised by the proceedings is whether the ICC may legally
enforce its jurisdiction upon Sudan and President Al-Bashir taking into account
complementarity. Part IX of the Rome Statute, entitled "International cooperation and judicial assistance," addresses issues of cooperation of state parties and
non-state parties. 205 State parties must cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 206 The
fact that Sudan is a non-state party to the ICC creates a problem of enforcement. 207 The Rome Statute does mention that, in situations that involve a nonstate party, the Court may invite the state to cooperate with the terms of an ad
hoc agreement. 208 After an agreement has been reached and the state does not
comply then the Court can inform the UN Security Council, but only if it was the
Security Council that first referred the situation to the ICC. 2 0 9 So far Sudan has
refused to cooperate with the ICC's arrest warrants. 2 10 Even though Sudan is a
non-state party, it is a signatory to the Rome Statute, 2 11 and as such had certain
obligations to refrain from "acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of
the Rome Statute2 12 up until the time that made its intention clear that it did not
want to become a party to the Rome Statute. 2 13 Therefore, an argument could be
made that by committing acts of war crimes and crimes against humanity Sudan
has violated its obligations. 2 14
After the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb were issued, the government
of Sudan did take certain steps. For example, President Al-Bashir established a
National Commission of Inquiry (NCOI) to investigate the Darfur crimes.2 15 The
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commission did acknowledge acts of killings and bombings of civilians by government forces, but underemphasized their magnitude and severity. 2 16 A Special
Court of Darfur was established, though it was later replaced by three regional
special courts, and completed several criminal cases. 2 17 However, the prosecutions only involved low-level suspects on charges that were not nearly as severe
as those that Harun and Kushayb were accused of.2 18 Kushayb was eventually
arrested by local authorities, then released, 2 19 then re-arrested. 2 2 0 Harun has
never been arrested, but rather now serves as the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs. 22 1 Many human rights groups were, and still are, questioning
whether Sudan's national courts will ever prosecute senior government officials
for violations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 222
In December 2007, the ICC Prosecutor submitted to the Security Council that
Sudan had not complied with its obligations stemming from UN Security Council
Resolution 1593.223 In May 2008, the ICC Prosecutor informed the Pre-Trial
Chamber that Sudan had failed to cooperate in response to the arrest warrants. 2 24
In response, in June 2008, the Security Council sent a mission to Africa where it
met with President Al-Bashir. 225 "The Security Council members urged the government of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC's investigations of Ahmad Harun
and Ali Kushayb." 226 However, the Sudanese government refused to hand over
both individuals on the grounds that Sudan is not a state party and thus is not
bound by any ICC decisions. 227 President Al-Bashir could escape indictment if
he handed over Harun and Kushayb. 2 2 8 But, Sudan rejected any deal that would
send any Sudanese citizen to the ICC. 2 2 9
In a report on the Sudan, the Security Council stated,"[t]here may indeed be
instances where a domestic system operates in an effective manner and is able to
deal appropriately with atrocities committed within its jurisdiction. However, the
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very nature of most international crimes implies, as a general rule, that they are
committed by State officials or with their complicity; often their prosecution is
therefore better left to other mechanisms."2 30
In summary, it appears that the ICC can lawfully exercise its jurisdiction over
Sudan and its president. Even though Sudan is not a state party, the fact that it is
a signatory to the Rome Statute 231 and that the situation was referred to the ICC
by a Chapter VII Security Council Resolution 232 lends supports to ICC having
jurisdiction over the conflict in Darfur as long as the complementarity principle is
followed. 2 3 3 First, Sudan has not complied with Security Council Resolution
1593, nor with ICC arrest warrants of Harun, Kushayb, and Al-Bashir. 234 Therefore, under the principle of complementarity, a core principle of the Rome Statute, the ICC can enforce its jurisdiction over these individuals because Sudan is
"unwilling" to prosecute. 235 Although the ICC exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rome Statute, 2 3 6 a more compelling question is whether its issuance is desirable given the current situation.
The ICC is sometimes confronted with prosecuting criminals engaged in ongoing conflicts. In so doing, the Court is confronted with weighing the interests of
peace and justice in determining whether to proceed with a prosecution. 2 3 7 The
prosecution of Omar Al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, showcases the tension
that exists between peace and justice. 238
In response to the ICC arrest warrant, Al-Bashir argued that the ICC's case
was a western ploy to target Sudan's oil and gas resources. 2 3 9 Al-Bashir stated,
"we have refused to kneel to colonialism, that is why Sudan has been targeted ...
because we only kneel to God." 2 4 0 He then expelled ten of the largest international aid agencies from Darfur, 2 4 1 drawing criticism from foreign states and the
230 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, 144, 1 568 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/ sudan/comjinq-darfur.pdf.
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UN. 24 2 Supporters of Al-Bashir marched in the city streets chanting his name
and criticizing the ICC. 2 4 3 Others, who have suffered as a result of the conflict,
support his arrest but ultimately want peace above all else. 2 44 The situation has
resulted in mixed opinions from governments as to the prudence of the ICC's

arrest warrant. 2 4 5
While there is support among many states for an investigation into the crimes
that were being committed in Sudan, other states, such as South Africa and
China, have been critical of the ICC indictment of President Al-Bashir, fearing
the indictment could damage the peace talks. 2 4 6 Jakaya Kikwete, the President of
Tanzania and the current head of the African Union, recently announced that
"justice has to be done. Justice must be seen to be done. What the AU is simply
saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is peace. That is priority
number one now." 24 7 Even the government of Southern Sudan which was originally in favor of the ICC, is now concerned that Al-Bashir's arrest warrant will
curtail the peace process. 248 Security Council Resolution 1828 (2008) mentioned
that several members had expressed concern regarding potential developments
that have subsequently occurred after the ICC Prosecutor submitted an application for an arrest warrant of Al-Bashir. 2 4 9
American support has been mixed. Former U.S. envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, stated that the ICC arrest warrant of President Al-Bashir will damage peace
negotiations because leaders will be reluctant to compromise for fear that they
will face trial at the ICC. 2 5 0 However, it appears that the Obama administration
will be more supportive of the arrest warrant. For example, U.S. Ambassador to
the UN Susan Rice and State Department Spokesman Robert Wood have both
spoken in support of ICC's investigation and prosecution of those responsible for
the atrocities committed in Sudan.2 5 1
ICC Prosecutor Ocampo faced the dilemma of weighing the interests of peace
against that of justice when he submitted a request for an arrestwarrant for Presi242 US, France unhappy about Arab & African support to Sudan's Bashir: report, SUDAN TRIB., Apr.
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dent Al-Bashir. 25 2 Mr. Ocampo explained how the evidence collected clearly
shows the guilt of President Al-Bashir and that justice must be done for the victims of the conflict. 2 5 3 He expressed concern for the situation of the peace talks
in Sudan but explained that he has to perform his judicial duties regardless of any
political factors. 254
VIII.

Conclusion

As to the situation of Al-Bashir it will probably be many years before Al-Bashir
will ever be tried by the ICC, when considering the delicate balance of peace
versus justice within Darfur and the fact that he is the current head of state of
Sudan. However, speed in the area of criminal prosecution under international
law has never been very fast. Radovan Karadzic evaded custody for 13 years,
without causing serious damage to the ICTY's credibility. Since the ICC does
not have a police force, it will be up to the states to act. The ICC should not
rescind the arrest warrant nor negotiate an amnesty. The Court must stay true to
its mandate and prosecute major war criminals or it risks becoming irrelevant.
The risk of granting impunity for a major war criminal would undermine the
effectiveness and need of the ICC.
While the U.S. still has many concerns about the ICC, its participation at the
2010 Review Conference and the recent statements and actions of the Obama
administration suggests a shift in U.S. policy toward the ICC. Since the days of
the Second World War, the U.S. has proclaimed its position as a supporter and
leader in humanitarian law and in the prosecution of war criminals. The U.S. has
finally realized that by sitting down at the table they gained the ability to shape
and influence the Court in ways that meet their concerns. However, there is still
a long to go before U.S. support for the Court is complete and unconditional.
While the Court has yet to complete one trial, and has failed to garner the
support of several of the most powerful states, especially the U.S., it is still in
operation, pursuing heads of states for war crimes, while continually adding more
state parties as the years go by. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor at the U.S.
Department of State, stated at a State Department Press Conference on June 15,
2010, "There are now 111 states parties. It's [Rome Statute] not going to go
away." 255
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